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Previous research has suggested that stability of self-concept differs across cultures:
in North American cultural contexts, people’s self-concept is stable across social
contexts, whereas in Japan, different self-concepts are activated within specific social
contexts. We examined the implications of this cultural difference for preference-choice
consistency, which is people’s tendency to make choices that are consistent with
their preferences. We found that Japanese were less likely than Americans to choose
items that they liked the most, showing preference-choice inconsistency. We also
investigated the conditions in which Japanese might exhibit greater preference-choice
consistency. Consistent with research showing that in Japanese culture, the self is
primarily conceptualized and activated by social contexts, we found that subtle social
cues (e.g., schematic representations of human faces) increased preference-choice
consistency among Japanese, but not among Americans. These findings highlight that
choices do not reveal preferences to the same extent in all cultures, and that the extent
to which choices reveal preferences depends on the social context.
Keywords: choice-preference consistency, culture, self, social cue, agency
INTRODUCTION
Choice and Agency Model across Cultures
People in aﬄuent modern societies make numerous choices in their daily lives, for example,
choosing cookies from 85 options in a American supermarket, or choosing from over 100 different
types of seafood in a Japanese supermarket. A key question then arises: On what basis do people
make their choices? Do they always choose the products what they like the most?
Choice is an agentic behavior that is likely based on people’s internal states, such as their
preferences or attitudes. Importantly, past research has shown that making choices based on one’s
own preferences is observed more frequently in European-American cultural contexts than in
Asian cultural contexts (Iyengar and Lepper, 1999; Savani et al., 2008).
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In the current paper, we test cultural differences in preference-
choice consistency. We ask whether people in Japan make choices
based on their preferences when their sense of agency is activated
by subtle social context cues, whereas people in the US choose in
accordance with their preferences regardless of the presence or
absence of social cues.
Preference-Choice Consistency across
Cultures
Previous research has found that in European Americal cultural
contexts, people base their choices on their personal preferences,
and are motivated to maintain consistency between their
preferences and their choices (Wilken et al., 2011). For example,
when asked to choose which of five similar pens to keep, 84%
of American participants chose to keep the pen that they had
just rated as liking the most (Savani et al., 2008; Study 3).
Indeed, in American cultural contexts, good actions “are freely
chosen contingent on one’s own preferences, goals, intentions,
and motives” (Markus and Kitayama, 2003, p. 7). Individuals
in American cultural contexts are highly sensitive to their own
internal states, such as their preferences, and make choices as
an expression of their self, thus affirming this disjoint model of
agency.
Yet, while individuals are defined in terms of core internal
attributes in the American cultural contexts (Shweder and
Bourne, 1982; Markus and Kitayama, 1991), they are more
often defined in terms of social relationships or situations in
the Japanese cultural context (Lebra, 1976; Hamaguchi, 1985;
Markus and Kitayama, 1991). In Japan, “preferences, goals, and
intentions are interpersonally anchored” (Markus and Kitayama,
2003, p. 7). In conjoint models of agency, agentic actions (e.g.,
choices that are based on personal preferences) are not be salient
without a social context. For example, when asked “Who are
you?” Japanese respondents were less likely to describe abstract,
context-independent attributes, such as personality traits, than
Americans. But when asked to answer the same question about
a specific social context (e.g., “Who are you at school?”),
Japanese were more likely to describe abstract attributes than
Americans (Cousins, 1989). Uchida et al. (2009) also suggested
that one’s internal states (i.e., emotion) are activated in self-
focused situations among Americans with disjoint models of
agency, whereas they are activated by social relationship cues (i.e.,
other persons) among Japanese with conjoint models of agency.
Thus, for Japanese people, internal states, including emotions and
preferences, are more likely to be activated and expressed when
the social context is salient.
Preference-Choice Consistency across
Cultures When the Social Context Is
Salient
Importantly, even subtle social cues provide sufficient
interpersonal context for the Japanese sense of self to be
activated (Kitayama et al., 2004). Thus, we hypothesized
that Japanese would exhibit lower baseline preference-choice
consistency than Americans, but that under conditions in which
the social context is made salient (via subtle social cues), Japanese
would exhibit higher preference-choice consistency.
Initial support for the hypothesis that social cues would lead
to greater (rather than lower) preference-choice consistency in
Japan, comes from previous research manipulating social cues in
the standard free choice cognitive dissonance paradigm. In this
paradigm, participants are first asked to indicate their preferences
for several items. The experimenter then asks them to choose
between two closely ranked items, and then reassesses their
preferences. The typical finding is that compared to the first
round of preference rankings, people increase the ranking of the
chosen item and decrease the ranking of the non-chosen item, a
phenomenon termed spreading of alternatives, which is a way of
reducing cognitive dissonance (Brehm, 1956).
Although spreading of alternatives is a highly reliable
finding in the American contexts, multiple studies found
that Japanese do not exhibit such choice justification in the
standard paradigm (Heine and Lehman, 1997). However, after
thinking about the preferences of others, Japanese do spread
the alternatives and thus exhibit cognitive dissonance (Kitayama
et al., 2004). Similarly, although Japanese do not exhibit cognitive
dissonance by spreading the alternatives when making choices for
themselves, they show cognitive dissonance when making choices
for a friend (Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005).
Furthermore, subtle interpersonal anchors, such as the
presence of schematic depictions of human eyes that give a sense
that the person is being watched by others (i.e., in a social context)
lead Japanese to exhibit cognitive dissonance (Kitayama et al.,
2004; Imada and Kitayama, 2010). These findings suggest that
making choices for others and making choices in the presence
of social cues have similar effects. Indeed, mere exposure to a
face cue automatically evokes a social context for those who have
a relatively high interdependent self-construal (Qin et al., 2010;
Park and Kitayama, 2014).
In the present study, we assessed preference-choice
consistency in Japanese and American cultural contexts
using a within-person preference-choice paradigm (Savani
et al., 2008, Study 3). We employed the same social context
cues as used in previous research as they have been shown to
automatically evoke a social context (Kitayama et al., 2004; Ishii
et al., 2010).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We recruited 42 students at Columbia University in the USA (28
women, 14 men; mean age 21.21 years; 15 European American,
4 African American, 2 Latin American, 13 East Asian, 5 South
Asian, 2 multiracial, and 1 unreported) and 51 participants at
Koshien University and Kwansei Gakuin University in Japan (22
women, 28 men, 1 of unreported gender; mean age 21.12 years).
Participants were randomly assigned to either the face (social cue)
condition or the no-face (no social cue) control condition. All
materials were prepared in English and translated into Japanese
for use in Japan. Participants provided written informed consent
to participate in this study. Research on human subjects was
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approved by Columbia University’s Human Subjects protocol
IRB-AAAF4543:Y1M00.
Preference-Rating Phase
In the first round of the study, participants were presented with
color images of consumer items, ranging in size from 150 to
240 pixels, at the center of the computer screen one at a time.
For each item, they were instructed to “rate the extent to which
you like the item” on a scale ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 4
(“a lot”). Sixty-four different items were presented in random
order. The stimuli included eight common everyday items,
one from each of eight categories (chairs, colors, cups,
tile patterns, plants, shirts, umbrellas, and watches). Within
each category, the item images were taken from the same
website to create homogenous sets of four items each.
There was no manipulation during the preference-rating
phase.
Choice Phase
In the subsequent choice phase, we used the stimuli from the
preference-rating round. We divided the eight items from each
category into two groups of four items each, yielding a total of
16 choice sets. The order of presentation of the 16 choice sets was
randomized for each participant. For each choice set, participants
were instructed: “From each group, suppose that you can get one
of the four items for yourself. You have to choose one item that
you want most for yourself.”
Social Cue Manipulation
After participants made each choice, they were asked to indicate
whether the choice they just made was easy or difficult. In order to
manipulate whether social context information was subtly cued
or not, participants were randomly assigned to either the face
condition or the no-face control condition. In the face condition,
participants were shown a schematic smiley face below the
“easy” rating and a schematic frowning face below the “difficult”
rating (see Figure 1; see also Ishii et al., 2010, for a similar
manipulation). Thus, participants in the face condition were
incidentally exposed to the “eyes of the other” after every trial
of the choice round. In order to present face cues immediately
prior to the first choice trial, we also presented these schematic
faces on the instruction screen used to explain to participants
that they would be asked to judge the difficulty of their choice
after each trial. In the no-face control condition, participants were
not shown any schematic images with the difficulty questions (see
Figure 2).
RESULTS
We computed the consistency between participants’ preference
ratings and their subsequent choices, following the procedure
used by Savani et al. (2008; Study 3). To control for heterogeneity
in mean preference ratings across choice sets, we converted
participants’ preference ratings of the four items within each
choice set into ranks, with ranks averaged across trials. For ease of
interpretation, we reversed the rank of the chosen item, such that
FIGURE 1 | “Difficulty” screen used in the face condition.
FIGURE 2 | “Difficulty” screen used in the no-face condition.
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“4” indicated that the most preferred item was chosen and “1”
indicated that the least preferred item was chosen. For example,
if participants rated the four items in a choice set 4, 3, 2, and
1, then the corresponding ranks would be 4, 3, 2, and 1. If
they rated the four items 4, 4, 4, and 3, then the corresponding
ranks would be 3, 3, 3, and 1. If they rated the four items, 2,
2, 2, and 1, then the corresponding ranks would still be 3, 3, 3,
and 1. This ranking procedure removes between-participant and
between-trial differences in mean ratings of the items.
For each trial in the choice phase, we calculated the rank of
the chosen item. A higher rank for the chosen item indicates
greater preference-choice consistency. We averaged participants’
rankings of the chosen items across the 16 trials to yield
a composite measure of preference-choice consistency, and
submitted this measure to a 2 (Culture)× 2 (Condition) ANOVA.
We found a main effect of culture, F(1,89) = 4.56, p = 0.035,
indicating that overall, Americans showed a higher preference-
choice consistency than Japanese, MAmericans = 2.91, SE = 0.043,
MJapanese = 2.80, SE = 0.033. The main effect of condition
was not significant, F(1,89) = 1.17, p = 0.280, but there was
a significant Culture × Condition interaction, F(1,89) = 5.38,
p = 0.023. Follow-up contrasts indicated that there was no
significant effect of condition for Americans, F(1,89) = 0.70,
p= 0.410, MFace = 2.88, SE= 0.066, MNo−face = 2.94, SE= 0.057,
but Japanese participants had significantly higher preference-
choice consistency in the face condition than in the no-face
condition, F(1,89) = 6.41, p = 0.01 MFace = 2.89, SE = 0.045,
MNo−face = 2.71, SE = 0.042. Further, whereas Japanese
participants showed lower preference-choice consistency than
American participants in the no-face condition, F(1,89) = 9.76,
p= 0.002, this difference was not significant in the face condition,
F(1,89)= 0.02, p= 0.900 (see Figure 3).
We next tested whether the difficulty of choices varied
across culture and condition. We submitted the proportion
of trials that participants indicated as being “difficult” to a 2
(Culture)× 2 (Condition) ANOVA. There was a significant main
effect of culture, F(1,89) = 14.85, p < 0.001, MAmericans = 0.37,
SE= 0.023, MJapanese = 0.49, SE= 0.022. This result is consistent
with the notion that contemporary American society has many
more opportunities to perceive and experience actions as choices
FIGURE 3 | Mean rank of the chosen item by culture and condition
(adjusted marginal means). Higher numbers indicate greater
preference-choice consistency. Error bars indicate the standard errors of the
means.
(Snibbe and Markus, 2005; Savani et al., 2010) compared to
Japanese society. However, neither the main effect of condition
nor the Culture × Condition interaction were significant,
p’s > 0.330. The absence of any interaction effect indicates that
the social cue did not influence the difficulty of the choice itself.
Thus, subjective perceptions of choice easiness was independent
from preference-choice consistency
To test the robustness of the findings, we conducted another
ANOVA with preference-choice consistency as the dependent
measure, culture and condition as predictors, and participants’
gender, age, and proportion of difficult trials as covariates.
The key Culture × Condition interaction remained significant,
F(1,85)= 6.26, p= 0.010, indicating that the observed interaction
effect was robust even after gender, age, and difficulty of the
choice trials were controlled for.
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY
Although the data supported our theoretical prediction that
social cues can activate internal states and increase preference-
choice consistency among Japanese participants, there is an
alternative explanation: instead of activation of Japanese agentic
state of mind, the social cues might have Japanese to focus on
social norms and others’ expectations (Savani et al., 2015). We
tested these two explanations in a supplemental survey study.
Method
437 Japanese participants recruited through the task recruitment
website Lancers and 425 Americans recruited through Amazon
Mechanical Turk completed an online survey. We analyzed
376 Japanese (mean age = 38.20; 55% female) 372 Americans
(mean age = 34.88; 53% female; 78.0% European Americans,
6.4% African Americans, 3.8% Latino Americans, 3.6% Native
Americans, 5.1% Asian Americans, 3.6% other ethnicity).
Selection criteria required that participants correctly answer at
least 50% of eight attention check questions, be either US-born
US citizens (in the US sample) or JP-born Japanese citizens (in the
Japanese sample) and be aged 20–75 to be included for analysis.
We presented participants with five items on seven-point
Likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree) measuring
their “preference-choice consistency orientation” (PCC, e.g.,
“When making choices, I believe it is important to express my
preferences/attitudes”) and five measuring their “social concerns
about preference-choice consistency” (SCC, e.g., “I will lose my
face if I do not act consistent with my opinions in front of
others”). Internal reliability of the PCC scale was α = 0.65 (JP)
and α = 0.73 (US), and that of the SCC scale was α = 0.72 (JP)
and α= 0.77 (US). The correlation between PCC and SCC scales
was r = 0.36 (p < 0.001) in Japan and r = 0.42 (p < 0.001) in
the US.
Results and Discussion
We conducted a 2 (JP and US) × 2 (PCC and SCC) repeated
measures ANOVA and found a significant main effect of culture
[F(1,751)= 155.80, p< 0.0001], showing that Americans showed
relatively higher PCC (M= 4.86; SE= 0.047) and SCC (M= 4.95,
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SE = 0.050) than Japanese (PCC: M = 4.49, SE = 0.047; SCC:
M = 3.89, SE = 0.050). We also found a significant interaction
[F(1,751)= 83.93, p< 0.0001], suggesting that differences across
cultures on PCC was smaller than differences across cultures on
SCC. That is, SCC was lower than PCC in Japan, but SCC was
higher than PCC in the US. We interpret these findings to suggest
that Japanese are not concerned if their choices are inconsistent
with their preferences in front of others. They also suggest that
Study 1’s findings with Japanese participants is unlikely to be due
to social concerns and is instead more likely due to the activation
of a sense of self that values preference-choice consistency.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study found that people in Japanese cultural
contexts were less likely to make choices according to their
preferences than people in American cultural contexts, and that
exposure to subtle social cues during the choice phase increased
Japanese participants’ preference-choice consistency, but not
that of American participants. This indicates that in cultural
contexts in which the self is assumed to exist primarily in an
interpersonal context (not autonomously by itself), social cues
can also direct attention toward the self and its internal states,
thus leading people to base their choices on their preferences.
The present findings highlight the importance of the presumed
other for even seemingly trivial and private acts, such as
choosing which cup, umbrella, or shirt one would like to have,
consumer choices that are very common both in the US and in
Japan.
Unlike previous research findings that Americans are less
likely to justify their choices after exposure to social cues
(Kitayama et al., 2004), in this study Americans’ preference-
choice consistency was unaffected by exposure to social cues.
This might be due to a ceiling effect, arising from Americans
predominantly basing their choices on their preferences (Savani
et al., 2008). Future research can further examine the differential
effects of exposure to social cues on post-choice justification and
preference-choice consistency.
The present finding that subtle social cues increase Japanese
people’s preference-choice consistency contrasts with recent
research showing that subtle social cues decrease preference-
choice consistency for Indians (Savani et al., 2015). In India,
preferences appear to be salient under normal conditions and
are deactivated in the presence of social cues, whereas in
Japan, preferences appear to be particularly obscure under
normal conditions, but are activated in the presence of social
cues. Thus, the relationship between the contingency of the
self on the social context varies significantly across Japan and
India.
Although Indian and Japanese cultures are both considered
interdependent cultures, one might expect important cultural
differences to exist when it comes to agency and social
relationships. Based on Hofstede’s analysis (Hofstede, 2001),
Indian cultural contexts are higher on power distance compared
to Japanese cultural contexts. In India, choices are perhaps
more likely to express “social conformity,” and thus need to be
consistent with the expectation of respected others, such as one’s
parents (Savani et al., 2012). In addition, research suggests that
Indians’ personal preferences are usually salient, even in non-
social contexts (e.g., Sen, 2005). When exposed to social cues,
however, their preferences shift from the self to others given
the importance of collectivism and social conformity. Thus, in
the Indian cultural context, social relationship cues might be a
distractor from self-expressive emotional states (such as focusing
on choice). Instead, personal preferences might be suppressed
and social adjustment toward others might be salient. As a
result, Indians’ preference-choice consistency might be reduced,
particularly if Indians are motivated to connect with others rather
than to distinguish themselves from others (Brewer, 1991; Kwan
et al., 2015).
Another possibility is that the discrepancy between personal
preferences and social norms might differ across Indian and
Japanese contexts. Given that social norms are stronger in India
than in Japan (Gelfand et al., 2011), people’s personal preferences
might be more likely to deviate from social norms in India.
Further, if social cues activate normative concerns in India
(Savani et al., 2012), people’s personal preferences might further
diverge from perceived norms. This might explain why Indians’
behaviors (such as choices) in social contexts are more consistent
with the expectation of others and further from their personal
preferences. In Japan, if people’s personal preferences are not as
distant from perceived norms as in India, even if social cues
activate normative concerns, these might not push people away
from their preferences. This might explain why Japanese people’s
choices in social contexts are more consistent with their personal
preference. Future research can directly test these ideas by
assessing the ease with which Indians and Japanese describe their
preferences, and by measuring the distance between personal
preferences and perceived norms, in both social and non-social
contexts.
In addition to contributing to social psychological theories
on choice, our findings have implications for cross-cultural
consumer behavior. Most advertising and marketing campaigns
attempt to change individuals’ preferences for different consumer
objects. But if people are not very likely to choose according
to their own personal preferences in the absence of social cues,
these strategies might have limited success. Our findings suggest
that marketers may benefit from creating conditions that cause
consumers to make choices in a social context.
Our findings provide a more nuanced view of the literature
on cultural differences in self-consistency (Kanagawa et al., 2000;
Suh, 2002). They suggest, perhaps ironically, that Japanese might
exhibit greater cross-situational self-consistency if their self-
evaluations are made in a social context (not just made about
a social context). Although Japanese are more likely to describe
themselves differently across different social situations, when
their immediate self is interpersonally anchored by even minimal
social cues, their self-view might become more consistent across
different social situations.
One limitation of this paper is that we could not elucidate the
mechanism underlying the effect of social cues on preference-
choice consistency. We assume that increased attention to
incongruities between different aspects of the self is responsible
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for the effect, but the process is likely implicit and unconscious.
One might argue that the schematic eyes in our study increased
preference-choice consistency among Japanese by reminding
participants to attend closely to the task rather than choosing
randomly. Yet, past research on cognitive dissonance suggests
that this is an unlikely possibility. In the presence of the schematic
eyes, Japanese exhibited a greater divergence between their
current and their previously stated preferences (Kitayama et al.,
2004), whereas more attentive preference ratings should lead
to a smaller discrepancy between previously stated and current
preferences. However, future research can clarify the process by
identifying how heightened attention to self-incongruities acts as
a mediator.
Whereas economists and researchers on decision making
typically assume that choices reveal either pre-existing
preferences (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) or
constructed preferences (Bettman et al., 1998), our findings show
that the extent to which choices reveal preferences varies across
cultures and contexts, and that preferences, whether pre-existing
or constructed, influence choices in ways that are culturally
contingent. The current study suggests that choice is not only
a personal or individualized behavior, but is also determined by
social relationships, especially in the Japanese social context.
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